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THE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES OF FIRMS, MARKETS, AND 
CONTRACTS: A UNIFIED THEORY 
 
Abstract 
The most efficient labor market mechanism depends on the advantages of 
specialization, workers’ costs of switching between entrepreneurs, and the frequency with 
which needs change. Multilateral mechanisms are more efficient when specialization is 
more advantageous, when it is cheap for workers to switch between entrepreneurs, and 
when individual entrepreneurs cannot occupy a worker on a full-time basis. Given a 
bilateral mechanism, employment (a firm) is more efficient than contracts when in-
process adjustments arise more frequently. There exists three regions in which firms, 
markets, and sequences of bilateral contracts are weakly more efficient than all other 
mechanisms in a big class.  
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Most economic research is conducted by taking a trading mechanism as given, 
imposing some subset of a standard set of assumptions, and then answering questions 
about the resulting behaviors and allocations. While this procedure has proven very 
fruitful, it raises some deeper questions: What determines the choice of mechanism in the 
first place? And why are firms, markets, and contracts so commonly used? On these, we 
are well short of a theory which is unified in the sense that it can explain all three 
mechanisms and do so without relying on assumptions different than those normally 
imposed in analyses taking each of the mechanisms as given.  
 Parts of the puzzle have been looked at individually:  Coase (1937) pioneered the 
comparison between firms and markets, Adam Smith and Stigler (1951) contrasted 
markets and bilateral mechanisms, while Grossman and Hart (1986) analyzed bilateral 
contracts and firms. However, these theories are driven by different forces and are not 
easily reconciled into a unified framework. Williamson (1971, 1975) offers a broader 
theory, but relies on several non-standard assumptions. 
The present paper proposes a unified answer driven by the interaction between 
four natural forces: The advantages of specialization, workers’ costs of switching 
between entrepreneurs, the size of entrepreneurs, and the frequency with which their 
needs change. The main effects are intuitive: multilateral mechanisms are more efficient 
when specialization is more advantageous, when it is cheap for workers to switch 
between entrepreneurs, and when individual entrepreneurs are “small” and cannot occupy 
a specialist on a full-time basis. Between bilateral mechanisms, employment is more 
efficient than a sequence of bilateral contracts when the needs of entrepreneurs change 
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more frequently. The interaction effects are more subtle: First, higher switching costs 
favor bilateral mechanisms more if new services are needed on a more frequent basis and 
if players are more patient. (Proposition 4i.) Second, the advantages of employment (over 
sequential contracting) when needs change frequently is amplified by certain bargaining 
costs, while the effect of patience is amplified by other bargaining costs. (Proposition 
4ii.) Third, smaller entrepreneurs mean that larger switching costs favor the market less. 
(Proposition 5ii.) Fourth, when entrepreneurs are smaller, more frequent changes in their 
needs and certain bargaining costs favor employment less. (Proposition 5iii.) 
We can illustrate the effects of specialization, switching costs, and adjustment 
frequency by the way in which a medium-sized apartment building is maintained. The 
owner will typically have an employee, the superintendent, perform minor repairs (“the 
toilet runs”). The building generates a steady flow of small problems, they tend to be 
urgent, and the superintendent can solve each of them pretty well. On the other hand, 
certain minor renovations, such as those having to do with electricity (“install LED light 
bulbs in public spaces”), are normally done through the market. The jobs are often larger, 
specialists can do them better, and the building does not need a full time electrician. 
Major renovations, for which advance planning reduces the need for in-process changes, 
are typically governed by a bilateral contract subject to occasional, though typically 
costly, renegotiations.  
The same example can illustrate the effects of size. A landlord who owns just one 
or two units will typically go to the market even for minor repairs because these units do 
not generate enough work to support a superintendent. On the other hand, very large 
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landlords, such as universities, typically use specialist employees (their “own” 
electricians) for both repairs and minor renovations.  
We analyze a simple model of trades in which entrepreneurs may need any of a 
wide variety of services, but do not know their needs in advance. (The dual facts that 
there are a very large set of possible services and that future needs are unknown combine 
to rule out long-term contracts, whether contingent or not.
1
) Entrepreneurs and workers 
can trade a sequence of labor services and these differ both in duration and the values put 
on them by each player. A player’s valuation is the sum of a prior mean, a personal type 
effect, and a variable measuring the fit between the player and the service. At any point in 
time, an entrepreneur only assigns positive value to a single service. The identity of the 
valued service and its duration are common knowledge, but the type and fit variables are 
private information, such that there is two-sided incomplete information in each trade. On 
the other hand, any specific service is fully contractible.  
The first wedge in the model is between gains from specialization and utilization 
in the market and saved switching costs in bilateral trade. The second wedge is coming 
from two-sided incomplete information in bilateral relationships. In such cases, we allow 
the players to learn their opponents’ valuations by incurring search costs. There is one 
cost for learning a single period valuation and another for learning the opponent’s type.  
The two least familiar components of the model are (a) that workers incur a 
switching cost when switching from one entrepreneur to another and (b) bargaining costs. 
We will briefly discuss the nature and modeling of both.   
(a) Workers incur a variety of costs when they switch from one entrepreneur to 
another. A worker serving one entrepreneur exclusively will know how that entrepreneur 
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does things, will understand what other workers do, and can be on-site and ready to work 
at a moment’s notice. In contrast, before working for a new entrepreneur, a worker has to 
find her, travel to the work site, learn about how to do things there, and spend time fitting 
his schedule to whatever else is going on there. After completing the work, he then has to 
manage the billing process, which on a per service basis is more onerous than the simple 
receipt of wages. There is a lot of variance in these switching costs; for a plumber they 
are mostly travel costs, but before an executive can work as a country manager for a 
multinational firm, it may be necessary to spend a year or more at headquarters, learning 
the “culture” of the firm.  We will use a single parameter for these “switching costs”, but 
they include as of the above as well as the search costs of Grossman and Helpman 
(2002), the metering costs of Barzel (1982), and the specific human capital investments 
of Hart and Moore (1990).  
(b)  Bargaining costs also come many guises. It is costly to prepare in advance, 
bargaining takes time and may be inefficient, and ill-will may fester afterwards.
2
 To stay 
with standard assumptions only, we represent all of these costs by a single example: 
agents’ expenditures on searching for information about their opponents. The idea is that, 
in the context of two-sided incomplete information, a bargainer can expect to do better if 
he has more information about the opponent’s reservation price.3 We assume that players 
have complete information after search and focus on cases with large expected gains 
from trade such that all agents choose to invest in search for competitive information. By 
thus transforming the bargaining costs from inefficient non-trade to search costs, we 
obtain simpler formulas for the comparative efficiency of mechanisms. The 
transformation is not innocuous in the sense that the two types of costs behave 
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differently.  In particular, the losses from inefficient non-trade are proportional to gains 
from trade, while search costs are proportional to the number of bargains undertaken. 
This plays an important role in our analysis, since we portray the employment mechanism 
as an attempt to economize on bargaining costs by pooling several negotiations into one.
4
  
Trades are governed by one of many possible mechanisms and we are interested 
in maximizing net efficiency for different types of trading problems. All mechanisms are 
built around the same sequence of informational events, and they only differ in two ways: 
For purposes of price determination, which subsets of players are in the same “bargaining 
bin”? And for purposes of trade, who is matched with whom? 
We start by focusing at three specific mechanisms which we suggestively will 
label as the “Market”, “Sequential Contracting”, and “Employment” mechanisms. After 
obtaining formulas for their expected performance, we go on to justify this focus by 
showing the existence of regions in which each of them weakly dominate alternative 
mechanisms in a very big class.  
(1) In the “Market” mechanism, a single price is found, and any entrepreneur who 
is willing to pay it trades with a worker who is willing to take it. To keep the argument 
simple, we assume that the Market functions without bargaining costs.
5
 Market payoffs 
thus only differ from the highest possible by the workers’ costs of switching between 
entrepreneurs. A good example of the advantages of markets could be refrigerator repair: 
Specialists can clearly perform the service much more efficiently than most laymen (such 
as a butler or a care-taker). Furthermore, the typical home-owner has the problem on a 
very infrequent basis, making it much cheaper to pay the switching costs instead of hiring 
an appliance repairman to stand by at the house.  
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(2) In the “Sequential Contracting” mechanism, entrepreneurs and workers pair 
up on a once-and-for-all basis, but negotiate new contracts whenever the entrepreneur’s 
needs change. While this economizes on switching costs, production costs will be higher 
since workers cannot specialize. Furthermore, the loss of market discipline forces the 
players to engage in bargaining over each potential trade. On those occasions, bargainers 
would like to know each other’s reservation values for the specific services needed by the 
entrepreneur. We focus on regions of the parameter space in which both players choose 
to search for this information and thus get complete information. Total payoffs from the 
mechanism therefore reflect occasional bargaining costs and average productivity (since 
all services are performed by a single player), but only one instance of switching costs. 
Surprises during home renovations are a good example. (“We tore up the floor and found 
rotten planks; they have to be replaced before we can continue.”) The expected number 
of bargains is small and the contractor on-site can do most such jobs without new 
switching costs and at production costs close to those incurred by the most efficient 
outsider. 
(3) In the “Employment” mechanism, the two players agree once-and-for-all on a 
single per-period price (wage) which then is applied to all future trades with the proviso 
that either player may terminate the relationship at any time. In this mechanism 
bargainers would like information about their opponent’s average valuation (type) and we 
again focus on cases in which both choose to search for this information. Concerning post 
bargaining behavior, we assume that the parties play a super-game equilibrium in which 
threats of termination allow the players to avoid as many inefficient trades as possible, in 
the limit maximizing gains from trade. So there is only one round of bargaining, but 
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again just average productivity. The aforementioned superintendent illustrates the 
attractiveness of this mechanism: In the typical case, so many things come up that it 
would be absurd to bargain on each occasion and most of the services are sufficiently 
simple that an experienced layman can perform them with reasonable efficiency.  
This theory of “employment as the at-will use of a specific trading mechanism” 
differs in important ways from many influential strands of the theory of the firm. First, 
unlike the property rights theory and variations thereof (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart 
and Moore, 1990; Board, 2011), the present argument does not depend on assets, and 
does not portray asset ownership and employment as two results of a single force. 
Second, the controversial distinction between observability and verifyability (Maskin and 
Tirole, 1999) does not play any role here. There is no hold-up, but contracts are 
expensive to negotiate in a bilateral context. Third, and related to the above, there are no 
“private benefits” in our model; everything is transferable, but it is in some contexts 
costly to agree on transfers. Finally, in contrast to many recent contributions, our 
argument relies on standard rationality assumptions only. 
On the other hand the theory also has several similarities with the literature. As 
Williamson (1971, 1975), and Hart and Moore (2008), it is about ex post adaptation 
rather than ex ante investment, as Macleod and Malcomson (1988), Baker, Gibbons, and 
Murphy (2002), and Halac (2012) it is about an implicit contract, as Taylor and Wiggins 
(1997) and Gibbons, Holden, and Powell (2012) it compares bilateral and multilateral 
mechanisms, as Bajari and Tadelis (2001), Bolton and Rajan (2001), and Matouschek 
(2004) it is about contracting/bargaining costs, and as Board (2011) it is about the 
tradeoff between advantages of specialization and “transaction-costs”.6 Our arguments 
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about the advantages of specialization associated with market solutions can be seen as 
analogues of points raised by Adam Smith (Ch. 1-3, 1965), Stigler (1951), Lucas (1978), 
and Rosen (1983).
 7
  
We analyze the three main mechanisms in Section I, holding the size of the 
entrepreneurs constant. Other mechanisms are shown to be weakly dominated in Section 
II, and we consider the consequences of varying the size of entrepreneurs in Section III. 
Implications and further research are discussed in Section IV.  
 
I. ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS FOR A SEQUENCE OF PURCHASES 
Time t is infinite and discrete; there is a set E of entrepreneurs with generic 
element e, a set W of workers with generic element w, and a set of labor services S with 
generic element s. Each entrepreneur “needs” one service per period and each worker can 
perform any service, but only one per period. Services are in equal demand in the sense 
that each is needed by │E │/│S │entrepreneurs in each period. In a more general 
analysis, │E │ = │W │ would be a property of equilibrium, but we here simply assume 
it. The length of a period is defined by the time between changes in needs. So if r (0, 1) 
is the one period discount rate, 1/r is a measure of the frequency with which adaptation is 
necessary. 
If e needs s in a given period, her valuation is vs = v + ve + ves, where v is a 
population mean, ve is the entrepreneur’s “type”, and ves describes the “fit” between 
entrepreneur e and service s. The types and fits are private information and are iid draws 
from non-degenerate uniform distributions with domains [-¯ve, ¯ve], and [-¯ves, ¯ves] 
respectively. The entrepreneur gets no value from any other services.  
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Each worker is an “expert” in one service and there are an equal mass of experts 
(│W │/│S │) in all services. An expert can perform this service at cost c* while his costs 
for any other service are cs = c + cw + cws, where c is a population mean, cw is the “type” 
of worker w, and cws describes the “fit” between the skills of worker w and service s.
 
A 
worker’s type and fits are private information and are iid draws from uniform 
distributions with domains [-¯cw, ¯cw] and [-¯cws, ¯cws], respectively, and c* < c -¯cw -
¯cws. To avoid trivial sub-cases in some of the following, we focus on the case in 
which¯ve  (0,¯ves),¯cw  (0, ¯cws), and ¯cws  (¯ves/2, 2¯ves). So the variance in types is 
lower than that in fits, but the variance in costs can be larger or smaller than that in 
values.  
Players can write binding contracts, but S is so big that a complete contingent 
claims contract is infeasible. In this spirit, and to keep things simple, we make the 
extreme assumption that contracts can specify a single price only. Because of unmodeled 
differences between individual entrepreneurs and workers, we also assume that any 
agreement that ties two players together for more than one period has to be negotiated 
bilaterally.
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 Multilateral contracting is costless, but bilateral contracting is costly because 
the two-sided asymmetric information causes the parties to incur some bargaining costs. 
The entrepreneur can, however, reduce the information asymmetry by learning the 
worker’s type cw or his cost cs of providing the specific service s by incurring search costs 
K or k, respectively. Similarly, the worker can learn the entrepreneur’s type ve or her 
valuation vs of the specific service s by incurring search costs K or k, respectively.  
Players explore the possibilities for trade and negotiate contracts in “bargaining 
bins”. These can consist of any number of entrepreneurs and workers, but a player can 
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only participate in one bin per period. This means that a player who cannot reach 
agreement will not be able to try another bin until the next period. 9 (Without this 
assumption the bins are somewhat meaningless.)  
The bargaining protocol used for bilateral bargaining is that the entrepreneur gets 
to make a TIOLI offer with probability θ (0, 1), while the worker makes the offer with 
probability 1 - θ. If an offer is refused, the trade to which it applied does not take place, 
and both players have zero payoffs in that period. While the TIOLI protocol raises some 
unpleasant questions about renegotiation, we follow a lot of literature and use it for 
technical convenience.
10
 We do not assume a specific protocol when bargaining is 
multilateral (it could be a version of TIOLI), but simply assume that the players agree on 
a single price at which equal numbers of workers and entrepreneurs are willing to trade.  
Workers incur switching costs u each time they perform a service for a new 
entrepreneur. To keep the analysis uncluttered, we assume that u < v - ¯ve - ¯ves – c* such 
that all trades are efficient when workers perform the services at which they are experts. 
The critical parameters are c – c* (the mean advantages of specialization), u 
(workers’ costs of switching between entrepreneurs), 1/r (the frequency with which 
entrepreneurs’ needs change/the inverse discount rate), and K, k (the search/bargaining 
costs).
11
  
We will consider mechanisms that can be constructed by inserting matching and 
price determination stages into the Common Sequence of Events defined as follows: 
 
Prior to the start of the first period:  
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0. 1. Players learn their types and fits and workers learn the services at which they are 
experts.  
In the first and all subsequent periods t = 1, 2, … 
t. 1. Needs of all entrepreneurs are revealed.  
t. 2. If agreement is reached, workers perform services. 
 
All mechanisms have to respect budget constraints and we look at the most efficient sub-
game perfect equilibria of each mechanism. 
 
I. 1. Market  
Putting the unique stages (price determination and matching) in bold, we define 
the “Market” mechanism as follows: 
 
Prior to the start of the first period:  
0. 1. Players learn their types and fits and workers learn the services at which they are 
experts.  
In the first and all subsequent periods t = 1, 2, … 
t. 1. Needs of all entrepreneurs are revealed.  
t. 2. Price determination: The players are put into │S│ bargaining bins each 
consisting of all experts on a particular service along with all entrepreneurs 
who need it. They agree on a price such that equal numbers of workers and 
entrepreneurs want to trade.
12
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t. 3. Matching: In each bargaining bin, players who are willing to trade are 
randomly matched. All matched workers incur switching costs u. 
t. 4. If agreement is reached, workers perform services. 
 
PROPOSITION 1: The total social surplus expected (per worker per period) in the 
Market mechanism is 
Πm ≡ v – c* – u                                                        (1) 
PROOF: See Appendix  
 
Payoffs differ from the best possible by the switching costs only and these costs 
matter less for services of longer duration. This conforms to our intuitions about the 
efficiency of larger markets, the gains from specialization, and the difference between 
having a repair done by a housekeeper versus waiting for a professional to come out and 
having to pay for his travel and set-up.
13
 We could also interpret u as a decrease in 
entrepreneur benefits due to delayed delivery or as a combination of increased costs and 
reduced benefits. In the next two mechanisms these costs are eliminated by having each 
worker dedicate himself to a single entrepreneur (such that he can avoid repeatedly 
paying u).  
 
I. 2. Sequential Contracting 
Entrepreneurs and workers can be matched in many different ways and the 
efficiency of the mechanism depends on exactly how this is done. However, we will state 
results that hold for both random and assortative matching - arguably the most natural 
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procedures. (To keep things simple, we will use formulas for random matching in later 
sections.) 
We define this mechanism as follows: 
 
Prior to the start of the first period:  
0.1. Players learn their types and fits and workers learn the services at which they are 
experts.  
0.2. Matching: The players are randomly (or assortatively) matched up in worker- 
entrepreneur pairs. The worker incurs switching costs. 
In the first and all subsequent periods t = 1, 2, … 
t. 1. Needs of all entrepreneurs are revealed.  
t. 2. Price determination: Each matched pair constitutes a bargaining bin. These 
players may pay to search for each other’s valuations. Nature decides who 
makes the TIOLI offer and the chosen player makes the offer aiming to 
maximize his or her own payoffs in the current period.
14
The other player 
accepts or refuses. Refusal means that both players get zero payoffs in this 
period.  
t. 3. If agreement is reached, workers perform services. 
 
The non-trivial decisions concern whether to search and how much to offer. We will look 
at the latter first. There are two different cases: 
 16 
(a) If the player making the offer knows the opponent’s valuation and trade is 
efficient, the offer will give all surplus to the player making it. If trade is 
inefficient, no trade is made and both get zero surplus. 
(b) If the player making the offer does not know the opponent’s valuation, the offer 
will maximize expected payoff taking into account the probability of rejection. 
   
We want to focus on situations in which players always search and thus know their 
opponents’ valuations. So payoffs in case (a) have to be higher than those in case (b). The 
latter will grow over time: In the first period, the risk of rejection will be evaluated based 
on the prior beliefs, but players will have better information about their opponent’s type 
in later periods, eventually knowing what it is.
15
 So after a while the uncertainty will be 
about fits only. Since better-informed players have weaker incentives to search, we look 
for conditions under which even they will do so (prefer case (a) to case (b)). Tedious, but 
trivial, calculations then give us the following intuitive result: 
 
FINDING 1: Players are more likely to incur search cost if they have more bargaining 
power, if needs change infrequently, if the variance in opponent fits is larger, and if the 
bargaining costs are lower. The probability increases in the components of value, while it 
decreases in the components of costs, and thus increases in expected gains from trade.
16
  
 
PROPOSITION 2: Assuming that both players always search, the ex ante expectation of 
social surplus (per worker per period) in the Sequential Contracting mechanism is  
Πsc ≡ ∫∫∫∫vs >cs (vs – cs) – 2k – ru                                          (2) 
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If matching is random, (2) equals 
  v – c + ∫∫(Max cs – Min vs)
3
/(96¯ves ¯cws ¯ve ¯cw)dvedcs – 2k – ru,        (2a) 
where the expectation is taken over vb and cs. If matching is assortative, (2) is  
 v – c + ∫{(c + ¯cws - v +¯ves  - x)
3
/(48¯ves ¯cws [¯ve + ¯cw])}dx – 2k – ru.       (2b)                      
PROOF: See Appendix 
  
The first term is the expected value that would be generated if the parties always traded, 
the second term is the expected benefit from avoiding inefficient trades, and the third 
term is the bargaining costs. So payoffs differ from the best possible by the workers not 
specializing and the ongoing bargaining costs. The Employment mechanism aims to 
reduce these bargaining costs. 
 
I. 3. Employment 
We define the “Employment” mechanism as follows: 
 
 Prior to the start of the first period:  
0.1. Players learn their types and fits and workers learn the services at which they are 
experts.  
0.2. Matching: The players are randomly (or assortatively) matched up in worker-
entrepreneur pairs. The workers pay switching costs. 
0. 3. Price determination 1: Each matched pair constitutes a bargaining bin. The 
players may pay to search for each other’s types. Nature decides who makes the 
TIOLI offer and the chosen player offers a price to apply to any one service per 
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period until one of the players terminate the agreement. The other player 
accepts or refuses. Refusal means that the players get zero payoffs in this and 
all future periods, and acceptance means that the players proceed to 1.1.  
In the first and all subsequent periods t = 1, 2, … 
t. 1. Needs of all entrepreneurs are revealed.  
t. 2. Price determination 2: Each player may make a claim about his or her private 
value. The players may agree not to trade in t. If so, they proceed to t +1. 1. 
Either player can terminate the agreement. If one does, the players get zero 
payoffs for this and all future periods. If neither does, they proceed to t. 3. 
t. 3. If agreement is reached, workers perform services. 
 
 The idea behind stage t. 2 is to allow a super-game equilibrium in which the 
players avoid inefficient trades to the largest extent possible, for example by not allowing 
claims of cws > cws’ and ves< ves’ in fractions much greater than (¯cws – cws’)/2¯cws and 
(¯ves + ves’)/2¯ves of large numbers of periods. By Corollary 2 in Jackson and 
Sonnenschein (2007), such an equilibrium can be asymptotically efficient as the per 
period interest rate r → 0. Away from this limit, the Employment mechanism will be 
burdened by occasional inefficient trades (in addition to the bargaining cum search costs). 
We will denote this loss by the positive I(r) which vanishes as r → 0. In much of the 
following we will focus on the limit and abstract from I(r), but since employment is more 
likely to be used exactly when r is small, this is not particularly offensive. 
It is important to note that the Employment mechanism depends on repeated 
trade: For at least one of the players, there will be trades with negative payoffs. These are 
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only consummated based on the expectation that future payoffs will come and on the 
average will be positive. Not surprisingly, we can characterize the conditions under 
which players will search in much the same terms as those under Sequential Contracting 
reported in Finding 1. 
 
FINDING 2: Players are more likely to incur search cost if they have more bargaining 
power, if the variance in the opponent’s types is larger, and if the bargaining costs are 
lower. The probability increases in the components of valuation, while it decreases in the 
components of costs, and thus increases in expected gains from trade.  
 
PROPOSITION 3: Assuming that both players always search, the ex ante expectation of 
social surplus (per worker per period) in the Employment mechanism is  
Πe ≡ ∫∫∫∫vs>cs (vs – cs) – r2K –ru – I(r)                                              (3) 
If matching is random, (3) equals 
  v – c + ∫∫(Max cs – Min vs)
3
/(96¯ves ¯cws ¯ve¯cw)dvedcs – r2K – ru – I(r),           (3a) 
where the expectation is taken over vb and cs. If matching is assortative, (3) is  
   v – c + ∫{(c + ¯cws - v +¯ves - x)
3
/(48¯ves ¯cws [¯ve + ¯cw])}dx – r2K – ru – I(r).  (3b)                        
 PROOF: See Appendix  
 
So payoffs differ from the best possible by the workers not specializing, the one-time 
bargaining costs, and the inefficient trades. 
 
I.4. Comparison 
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 Recapitulating, if the expected gains from trade are large, the expected social 
surplus (per worker per period) from the Market, Sequential Contracting, and 
Employment are 
                                   Πm ≡ v – c* – u,                                             (4)                                                      
Πsc ≡ v – c + E(Max cs – Min vs)
3
/(96¯ves ¯cws) – 2k– ru, and                     (5) 
Πe ≡ v – c + E(Max cs – Min vs)
3
/(96¯ves ¯cws) – r2K – ru – I(r).                  (6)                                    
We get the following effects: 
PROPOSITION 4: If the mean gains from trade are large, then: 
 (i) Comparing the Market mechanism and the bilateral mechanisms, we see that the 
Market is more efficient if switching costs are lower, if gains from specialization are 
larger, if bargaining costs are larger, and if the variances in fits and types are larger. 
Furthermore, the effect of switching costs is amplified if new services are needed on a 
more frequent basis and reduced if players are less patient. 
(ii) Comparing the Sequential Contracting mechanism and the Employment mechanism, 
we see that Employment is more efficient if new services are needed on a more frequent 
basis, if the fit bargaining costs are larger, if type bargaining costs are smaller, and if 
players are more patient. Furthermore, the effect of the frequency of new needs is 
amplified by larger fit bargaining costs, while the effect of patience is amplified by larger 
type bargaining cost. 
 
The Proposition has several appealing empirical implications. For example, 
according to part (i) Markets should be more prevalent in more densely populated areas, 
in fields that require more education, where the performance of laymen varies more. The 
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interaction effect further suggests that switching costs should matter more for services of 
shorter duration. According to Part (ii), Employment should be more prevalent for 
services that are subject to frequent change and services where opponent costs and values 
are harder to ascertain. The interaction effect predicts that these two effects are 
complements. 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate these results along the dimensions of frequency of 
change, switching costs, and gains from specialization. 
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Figure 1 
Most Efficient Mechanisms by Frequency of Change and Switching Costs 
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                                                                                          Employment 
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                                                                                                                              1/r  
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Figure 2 
Most Efficient Mechanisms by Frequency of Change and Gains from Specialization 
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While the model thus makes intuitively appealing predictions about the use of 
Employment, Markets, and Sequential Contracts, the existence of even better alternatives 
have not yet been ruled out. We will therefore look at the attractiveness of other 
mechanisms in Section II. 
 
II. OTHER MECHANISMS ARE WEAKLY DOMINATED 
In this Section, we justify the focus on the Market, Sequential Contracting, and 
Employment, by showing the existence of  regions in which each of the three 
mechanisms weakly dominate all other mechanisms in a very big class.  
Specifically, we define the class of mechanisms M as all ex ante individually 
rational incentive compatible mechanisms whose extensive form contains the Common 
Sequence of Events and satisfy the technological and informational constraints on the 
model.  
This implies that players may explore trades in bargaining bins with any numbers 
of entrepreneurs and workers, and that they may use any decision rules about the 
initiation, length, and termination of trading relationships. (In the focal mechanisms, 
trades are explored on a bilateral or global basis and trading relationships last one period 
or forever.) 
Unlike most proofs involving a search of mechanism space, the following turns 
out to be comparatively simple. Each of our three mechanisms deviates from efficiency in 
one or two discrete ways: search costs are r2K, 2k, or 0, average production costs are c or 
c*, trading inefficiency is I(r), and switching costs are u or 0.   
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THEOREM:  For each of our focal mechanisms, Market, Sequential Contracting, and 
Employment, there exists a region in which it weakly dominates any mechanisms in the 
class M.
17
  
PROOF: See Appendix  
 
III. SMALLER AND LARGER ENTREPRENEURS 
While the results so far have been derived under the assumption that each 
entrepreneur needs one worker per period, we now look at the effect of variation in the 
number of services each entrepreneur needs per period (“the size of the firm”).18 
III.1. Small Entrepreneurs 
Consider first what happens if an entrepreneur sometimes has no needs at all, but 
the equilibrium still requires the worker to stick around and be idle. To model this, we 
assume that the “zero service” is needed with probability z. The entrepreneur values this 
at zero and the worker incurs no costs while being idle (delivering the zero service). We 
continue to assume that both players will search in both the Sequential Contracting and 
Employment mechanisms. 
 In this scenario, the ex ante expectation of total surplus (per period per worker) in 
the Sequential Contracting, Employment, and Market mechanisms are  
Πsc ≡ (1 - z) [v –c + E(Max cs – Min vs)
3
/(96¯ves ¯cws) – 2k] - ru             (7) 
Πe ≡ (1 - z)[v –c + E(Max cs – Min vs)
3
/(96¯ves ¯cws)- I(r)] – r2K – ru               (8)                      
                                   Πm ≡ (1 – z)(v – c* – u)                                                (9)                                                      
So in addition to the results derived in Section I, this gives the following effects: 
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PROPOSITION 5: When entrepreneurs need help on a less regular basis:  
(i) The Market is more attractive and Employment is less attractive,  
(ii) higher switching costs favor bilateral mechanisms less, and 
(iii) more frequently changing needs and larger fit bargaining costs favor Employment 
less. 
  Also this Proposition has intuitively appealing implications. Part (i) predicts that 
smaller entrepreneurs acquire more services in the Market, and the interaction effects in 
part (ii) suggests that Market use is less sensitive to switching costs when we look at 
smaller entrepreneurs. Finally, the interaction effect in part (iii) implies that the effect of 
service duration on the use of Employment is reduced for smaller entrepreneurs.  
Figure 3 below illustrates this result. 
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Figure 3 
Most Efficient Mechanisms by Frequency of Change and Number of Needs  
1 - z                                                                                                
            
                 
       
                                                                               
          Sequential Contracting                                                               
 
                          Employment                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
                                                       
 
 
                 Market 
                                  
                                                                                                                          
1/r  
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III.2. Large Entrepreneurs 
We next consider the case in which some entrepreneurs are “large” and need the 
services of several workers. Since this is very straightforward, we will proceed 
informally.  
If an entrepreneur has regular needs in a narrow area, she can allow an employee 
to specialize, thereby closing part of the productivity gap between Employment and the 
Market. As suggested by the landlord example in the Introduction, such an entrepreneur 
could use Employment to acquire a relatively specialized service that normally would be 
traded in the Market. So specialized workers will either work in large firms or as 
independents.
19
 This also implies that larger entrepreneurs can benefit from lower 
average costs through improved division of labor (Smith, 1965; Stigler, 1951). They can 
do this by hiring experts, but also more simply by allocating each period’s services 
among the staff according to comparative advantages (though this is not modeled here).  
More generally, this is consistent with the stylized fact that larger firms internalize more 
functions. Effects of firm size are a natural part of the tradition starting with Adam Smith, 
but are unlikely to come out of a purely Coasian analysis of bilateral trading costs.
20
 It is, 
however, worth noting that the theory implies that firms have stronger incentives to 
expand if this enables them to hire more efficient specialists. So larger gains from 
specialization can lead to more firm governance. 
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IV. DISCUSSION 
The theory portrays Employment as more attractive if the entrepreneur has many, 
frequently changing needs, if it is costly for workers to switch from one entrepreneur to 
another, and if the advantages of specialization are small. This portrait shares many 
features with the similarly named real life trading institution. For example, one important 
stylized fact about the employment relationship is that no similar mechanism is used for 
trade in products made off-site. This is perfectly consistent with our characterization of 
the Employment mechanism. Its central advantage over the Market is that the worker 
avoids having to switch, and products made off-site would have to be transported no 
matter how they are traded, making it would be more efficient to use the Market 
mechanism. (For products made on-site we would have to discuss whether or not the 
operator should transition, putting us back in the Employment mechanism.) Another 
strong regularity is that employment is a relationship which never is used for one-shot 
trades. The same is true of our Employment mechanism for two reasons; it depends on an 
implicit contract and avoidance of switching costs is one of its main advantages.
21
   
The theory has many testable implications in the areas of organizational, trade, 
and labor economics. A strong prediction of the bargaining cost component of the 
analysis is that smaller, more frequently changing services are more likely to be governed 
by Employment. Other testable hypotheses are driven by the gains from specialization 
and switching costs. One possibility is to see if there has been a recent increase in 
outsourcing in fields where remote work has become possible over the last twenty years 
(Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000). At an anecdotal level, this would seem to be consistent 
with the recent growth in western firms’ business process outsourcing to countries like 
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India. Another is to test if larger firms internalize more functions and are more efficient. 
The results of Hortacsu and Syverson (2007) and Atalay, Hortacsu, and Syverson, (2013) 
are suggestive of this (although it should be noted that the quite different model of 
Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004, makes very similar predictions). It should finally be 
possible to see if needs with greater gains from specialization are less likely to be met by 
employees.  
In terms of future theoretical research it is tempting to develop a model of labor 
market equilibrium, or even general equilibrium, with endogenous trading mechanisms.
22
 
By allowing for appropriate heterogeneity, such a model would have an equilibrium in 
which the three mechanisms are used in different proportions depending on the types of 
services and players involved. Another possibility is to expand the domain of the model 
by considering larger organizations and asking questions about scope, delegation, 
mergers, etc.  
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APPENDIX: PROOFS 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:  
Since all trades are consummated, the expected gains per worker are  
E(v + ve + ves) – c* – u = v – c*– u.  
QED  
  
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:  
To get (2a), we first integrate the first term of Πsc with respect to vbs and cws, using that 
their distributions are uniform. We then note that c + cw +¯cws is the highest possible cost 
given cw and that v + ve - ¯ves is the lowest possible value given ve. If matching is 
random, types vb and cw are independent, and we integrate over both of them. 
If matching is assortative, types are matched sequentially along a single dimension such 
that the highest unmatched vb is matched with the lowest unmatched cw, and so on. To get 
(2b), use that matching makes the ve – cw variable uniform on [-¯ve - ¯cw, ¯ve + ¯cw]. 
QED 
   
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: 
By an argument parallel to that used to prove Proposition 2.  
QED 
 
PROOF OF THEOREM: 
There are six components of efficiency in this model: Getting jobs done by the 
lowest cost workers (division of labor), avoiding switching costs, minimizing the two 
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types of bargaining costs, maximizing gains from trade (efficient trade), and not leaving 
workers idle (unmatched or jointly matched another worker and a single entrepreneur).  
Sequential Contracting implements all efficient trades if the players invest in 
search, while Employment implements all efficient trades if adaptation is frequent and 
players invest in search. Per Findings 1 and 2, players invest in search if v-c is large 
relative to k and K. Since the Market always implements all efficient trades, we thus have 
 
LEMMA 0:  For fixed θ, c*, u, k, K, we can find small values of r and large 
values of v-c such that our three focal mechanisms perform as summarized in Table 1 
below. 
 
Table 1 
Components of Efficiency and Performance of Mechanisms 
     Market   Sequential Contracting    Employment 
Division of Labor Full 1 1 
Switching Costs 2 Full Full 
Type Bargaining  Costs Full Full 3 
 Fit Bargaining Costs Full 3 Full 
 Efficient Trade Full Full Full 
No Idle Workers Full Full Full 
        1, 2, and 3 are defined in the text. 
 
A mechanism can only be more efficient than these if it does better in a cell 
labeled 1, 2, or 3 without losing more in cells labeled “Full” in the same column. 
 33 
The only way to do better in the cells labeled “1” is to permanently put more 
workers into an entrepreneur’s bargaining bin (in effect hiring several people to do one 
person’s job). Compared to the Market, this would avoid switching costs, but cause some 
workers to be idle and do less well on the division of labor. Compared to Sequential 
Contracting or Employment, it leaves some workers idle but improves on the division of 
labor. Since the cost of idling grows with v-c, we have  
 
LEMMA 1: For fixed θ, c*, u, k, K, we can find small values of r and large 
values of v-c such that at most one worker should be based on site. 
 
The only way to do better in the cell labeled “2” is to sometimes let a worker 
continue contingent on his costs (asking the carpenter to hang around to see if he wants to 
do the plumbing as well). This mechanism, which we will refer to as Contingent 
Turnover, involves keeping last period’s worker until the next need is revealed. The 
incumbent worker can then stay and do the job iff his costs are less than c* + u, those of 
an expert.
 
There are two versions of this; in Contingent Employment a replaced 
incumbent returns after missing a job, and in Contingent Sequential Contracting the 
incumbent position shifts to the new worker. An example of the former would be the 
employee idling while an expert, such as a plumber, does a specific job. The latter would 
involve the plumber staying around to see if he could do the electrician’s job. Since this 
does not allow him to enter another bargaining bin in the same period, a replaced worker 
will be idle for one period. Compared to the Market, Contingent Turnover does better on 
switching costs and less well on idling of workers, the division of labor, and bargaining 
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costs. Relative to Sequential Contracting, it improves the division of labor, but does less 
well on switching costs and the idling of workers. Since the cost of idling depends on v-c, 
we have  
 
LEMMA 2: For fixed θ, c*, u, k, K, we can find small values of r and large values of v-c 
such that Contingent Turnover is weakly dominated by the Market, Sequential 
Contracting or Employment. 
            
We end by looking at the cells labeled “3”. Since all agreements tying two parties 
together for more than one period has to be negotiated bilaterally, the question is whether 
we can find a more efficient bilateral mechanism. Suppose that the players consider a 
mechanism m. Because trade is repeated, the randomness in “fits” vew and cws may 
average out over time. However, this argument does not apply to the “types” which are 
constant over time. The expected payoffs, Πme(ve, cw), Πms(ve, cw) will depend on ve and 
cw. The simplest way to negotiate a price will be in the form of a one-time pre-play 
transfer, negotiation about which will not affect m. But by Myerson-Satterthwaite (1983), 
no incentive compatible individually rational mechanism can govern such a negotiation 
in a fully efficient way. So we have 
 
LEMMA 3: For fixed θ, c*, u, k, we can find small values of r, large values of v-c, and 
small values of K such that any incentive compatible individually rational bilateral 
mechanism is weakly dominated by Employment.   
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Given Lemmas 0 -3, we can find regions in which the Market, Sequential 
Contracting, or Employment weakly dominates by letting c*, k, or K, respectively, 
become small, while holding the other parameters fixed. This then implies the Theorem. 
QED 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1
  In the working paper version of this paper, we justify this by looking at a “Price List” mechanism that is 
efficient only if a small number of services recur. Unlike the Employment mechanism, the Price List 
mechanism does not require repeated trade. 
2
 For example, Fehr, Hart, and Zehnder (2009) experimentally show that post-bargaining ill-will can cause 
significant inefficiencies. 
3
 Pre-play information gathering has been studied in the context of several other mechanisms, including 
auctions (Cremer, Spiegel, and Zheng, 2009). Busse, Silvia-Russo, and Zettelmeyer (2006) show that car 
entrepreneurs negotiate lower prices if they search for information about worker costs, and Simester and 
Knez (2002) report that firms take steps to make it harder for trading partners to acquire such information. 
4
 Maciejovsky and Wernerfelt (2011) experimentally show that the functional form of full-information 
bargaining costs lead to this behavior. 
5
 As highlighted by the works of Guasch (2004) and Calzolari and Spagnolo (2009), this is clearly an 
approximation. However, all that matters is that the bargaining costs are lower than in the bilateral 
mechanisms. 
6
 In Board (2011), the transaction costs come from the possibility of hold-up. 
7
 We focus on differences in innate abilities rather than scale or learning advantages, but could reformulate 
the model with few changes. 
8
 There are services for which this is not a reasonable assumption, but it simplifies the exposition by ruling 
out a mechanism that in an earlier version was called “Employment with market wages.” 
9
 This constraint makes it costly to let the continuation of a trading relationship depend on period by period 
cost realizations. 
10
 We just need the protocol to have the property that a player’s expected payoff with complete information 
is larger than that with incomplete information regardless of what his opponent knows. A suitable class of 
protocols is characterized in Wernerfelt (2012). 
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11
 In the working paper version of this paper, we consider a case in which these parameters differ between 
classes of tasks, such that different mechanisms can co-exist in the economy. 
12
This means that the equilibrium price is between c*+ u and v – ¯ve – ¯ves.  
13
 Many suppliers of home repairs, such as plumbers, appliance repairmen, and locksmiths, explicitly 
charge for travel plus time spent on site. 
14
 Since a sequence of offers will be made, the players could possibly gain by making offers depend on 
their history. However, unless full efficiency could be achieved, the directional effects will stay the same. 
Furthermore, it will turn out that Sequential Contracting is relatively most efficient in circumstances under 
which such repeated game strategies are harder to sustain (when the variances in fits are large and the 
periods are long.) To keep things simple, we make the extreme assumption in t.2. 
15
 This information could come from revealing offers, acceptances or rejections, as well as from search. 
16
 This is thus consistent with the often voiced intuition that players are willing to spend more when 
bargaining over higher rents. 
17
 It should be noted that the Theorem does not rule out the existence of regions in which other 
mechanisms dominate these three. 
18
 Further generalizations are considered in the working paper version of the paper. 
19
 In addition to size-differences, mixed mode governance could also come about if too few workers have 
costs that are low enough to justify using the market.  
20
 While efficiency advantages from internalizing gains from specialization will lead to larger firms, one 
could imagine that the opportunities to do so eventually will dry out or become less good. This could form 
the basis for a theory of the scope of the firm. 
21
 A third often cited property is the so-called common law test under which “the person you work for has 
the right to tell you what to do, how, when, and where to do your job” (Online Social Security Handbook, 
802.1, 2009). However, I do not believe that the definition coincides perfectly with everyday use.  
22
 General equilibrium models with endogenous institutions have been developed by Grossman and 
Helpman (2002), and Antras and Helpman (2004). 
